Investing During Recession
The economy has lost private sector jobs for three straight
months, credit markets continue to worsen, and confidence
levels for businesses and consumers alike have plummeted.
Corporate profit growth has been declining, especially for
banks, where write-offs are impacting book value and
impinging upon the ability of financial institutions to
extend credit.
This is not an environment that is conducive to growth. We
now believe that the economy has entered into a recession
that began in the fourth quarter of last year. This,
however, should not come as much of a surprise to those who
follow economic cycles. Martin Feldstein, the head of the
National Bureau of Economic Analysis, has patiently
deflected direct questions about recession with
probabilistic answers. However, we now see that there is a
significant decline in economic activity that has spread
beyond homebuilders – notably to banks, automobile
manufacturers, and retailers.
The Federal Reserve, despite their best intentions to create
an environment that stimulates credit creation, has not been
successful. Since the first Fed Funds rate cut last
September, the Dow has lost an additional 12%; bonds have
advanced 7%; gold has advanced another 35%; home prices have
slipped 7%; and the dollar has declined 7%. The banks have
become less willing and able to lend as much of the
economy’s recently minted — and poorly collateralized — debt
has become too much for financial institutions to hold on
their balance sheets.
The real issue is the amount of debt (credit) that has been
taken on (extended) by banks in the last cycle for the
funding of everything from mortgages to private equity
deals. Based on Federal Reserve data, the ratio of
debt-to-disposable income has risen to 140% of income from
an already elevated 100% ratio seen at the end of the 1990s
equity-led economic boom.
Before the clamor for a “super-SIV” and government-sponsored
efforts to save the housing market, there were banks and
borrowers who, through a carefully orchestrated dance,
created additional money (also known as “liquidity”) which
primed the economic machine. There are limits, however, to
how much liquidity can be absorbed by the economy the same
way that there are limits to how much can be consumed at any
given meal (and consequences that arise when we go
overboard).
Between 2000 and 2005, new borrowing as a percent of GDP
rose to 17.5% — far higher than the 9% ratio seen in the
1990s but not quite as high as the prior peak of 22% set in
1985. During these five years, total household debt
increased to $14.3 trillion from $6.7 trillion while incomes
grew to $10.3 trillion from $6.7 trillion. As mentioned
earlier, the ratio of debt-to-income now stands at 1.4 to 1
versus 1 to 1 in just seven years.
The resulting increase in money supply that accompanied such
massive credit formation has hurt the value of the dollar
and propelled asset prices, notably housing, to previously
unheard of levels. Now, the unwinding of the asset bubble
and the re-evaluation of the creditworthiness of the
borrowers is throwing the cycle in reverse.
In short, the inability and unwillingness of banks to extend
loans relates directly to the fact that residential real
estate prices have begun to fall and what little underlying
collateral there was for newly minted mortgages is now
impaired. According to a Goldman Sachs economist, if home
prices continue to slide by an additional 10% in 2008 that
30% of all mortgaged homeowners will have negative equity in
their homes. In other words, $3 trillion of mortgages will
have a face value in excess of the underlying real estate.
As employment trends head negative, the effect will likely
accelerate the foreclosure rate, force additional home price
adjustments nationally (there are nearly 5 million unsold
home and condominium units), and further erode banks’
capital and capacity to lend. Thus, the Federal Reserve must
take action on two fronts -- address the credit market's
immediate problems and cut short-term rates to help the
economy through recession.
The rate cuts to date, 2.25 percentage points, with
additional cuts likely should help the economy later this
year and into 2009. Rate cuts, while quite visible and
welcomed by investors, are not solutions for the credit
market squeeze which is expanding. Most credit spreads are
now wider (worse) than they were when the credit crisis
first hit last summer.
The Fed's plan to combat this condition is to pump another
$200 billion into short-term funding markets through a newly
created term auction facility alongside traditional
repurchase agreements. While such short-term facilities have
been in use since last summer, this time the Fed is
accepting a wider variety of collateral, including mortgages
and corporate loans which are part of the credit market's
problem to date. Providing liquidity for assets that have
been harder to sell in the open market is a tangible relief
step for bank capital. But the Fed can only do so much.
The emergence of these problems during a Presidential
election cycle multiplies the number of proposed solutions
and amplifies the sense of urgency. It is appropriate to
recall, however, that wrong-headed policies can make matters
worse. Attempts by bank regulators in Japan during the 1990s
to sweep their banking issues under the rug backfired, and
decisions made by our Federal Reserve in the 1920s and 1930s
to raise interest rates while remaining tied to the gold
standard further compounded the problems of that era. Today,
there are a variety of proposals to fix what ails the
housing market, and ultimately, the economy. There has been
talk of mortgage remediation, expansion of the government
and their sponsored agencies, and now a dialogue is emerging
about direct write-downs of mortgages by banks. As all of
this unfolds, falling home prices does improve housing
affordability and increases expected rates of return to
prospective buyers of property and mortgage-related assets.
In the end, the prospective rate of return to new investors
must be sufficient to attract risk capital. In the coming
years, however, the difficult lessons now being (re)learned
will likely result in more costly credit with greater
requirements for collateral on the part of borrowers.
“time heals all wounds..."
The adjustment process that has led us to these current,
more difficult economic times began in 2005. The cost of
money began to move higher as the Federal Reserve raised
interest rates; hurricane Katrina brought about destruction
in the Gulf, which fanned existing concerns about energy
prices; and for the first time in many years, the national
homeownership rate began to decline due to the
unaffordability of homes.
Meanwhile, credit and equity markets remained oblivious to
these changes and continued to price assets (especially
mortgage-related assets) to levels that seemed to imply a
riskless environment despite ongoing rate increases that led
to an inverted yield curve — a classic warning signal for
the economy.
As reality began to set in last summer, we saw markets start
to reprice risk. For example, real estate investment trusts
offered very little yield to investors prior to last July as
evidenced by the yield on the National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts’ index which fell far below the
yield on risk-free Treasury bonds. Today, that yield is more
than 2% over long-term Treasury bond yields and close to
their historic average. This, and the repricing of many
other markets, is healthy and creates incentive for new
capital to enter markets.
This is not to suggest that markets have completed this
process. One meaningful measure of overall market
expectations is the relative performance between stocks and
bonds. Here, we see equities (measured broadly by the
Russell 3000 Index) down 25% over eight months. While that
performance is about average for a bond-led cycle, it is
less severe than a bond-led cycle that also coincides with
recession. The average bond-led cycle during those periods
is closer to 1.5 years and a 35% underperformance by stocks
(outperformance by bonds). Thus, with recession looking
increasingly like reality, we would expect that equity
markets will likely correct for an additional period of
time.
The four key items to watch in order to gauge where we are
in the economy have been and remain:
• Trends in Household Demand for credit;
• Trends in Private Sector employment;
• Trends in corporate behavior vis-à-vis capital
expenditures and hiring plans in response to uncertainty and
declining profit growth;
• Rate of drawdown of excess supply of real estate still for
sale.
Unfortunately, we are unable to convincingly say that any of
these four trends have improved. Each category continues to
show accelerating deterioration at this time, with household
credit expanding at just 5% in the last quarter of ’07, with
corporate hiring and capital spending flat-to-down according
to the Federal Reserve’s recently released Flow of Funds
Survey, and last week’s negative employment report for
February and the recent data from the National Association
of Realtors on housing supply.
While the ultimate outcome is anyone’s guess, history has
shown that bonds tend to outperform stocks headed into
recessions. The table to the right looks at past recessions;
the length of the recession; and the performance of stocks
compared to bonds headed into recovery.
If we assume that a recession began late last year and will
last for a median length of time (about 8-13 months
historically, see table below) we might conclude that an
ordinary recession would take us through most of the year
this year with some hope for recovery in the later part of
the year or in the first part of 2009. Since markets also
tend to anticipate recovery about 3-9 months prior to the
start of recovery (see table below), we might expect to see
some change in market leadership, from bonds to stocks in
the second or third quarter of the year. If we do not see
such a change in leadership the market’s message would
obviously be more ominous as it relates to the economy in
2009.
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Our tactical asset allocation recommendations continue to
offer a highly conservative profile for the current market.
In light of the ongoing issues confronting markets and the
economy, we continue to emphasize large over small
capitalization stocks, growth over value, and consistent
sectors such as staples, healthcare, and utilities
(including telecommunications). Outside of the domestic
equity component, we maintain a diversified portfolio of
bonds, foreign equities, and a modest exposure to gold as a
hedge against potential future erosion of dollar-based
assets.
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March 10, 2008
Joseph V. Battipaglia
Market Strategist, Private Client Group |
Past Commentaries
January 22, 2008
Global Sell-off
More
December 27, 2007
Outlook 2008
More
December 7, 2007
NBER President Raises Recession Concerns
More
November 28, 2007
Equity Risk Heightened - Allocation Remains Defensive
More
September 25, 2007
After the Rate Cut
More
July 30, 2007
The Case For Growth
More
June 15, 2007
Data Affirms Tactical Asset Allocation Posture
More
March 19, 2007
Cutting Earnings And Equity Target
More
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